{"action":"read_pages","error":null,"help":null,"create":null,"read_pages":{"raw_output":"[pdf: pages=35, read=35]\n[images: count=3]\n[strikethrough: count=3]\n\n[page 1]\nUSAntitrustLaw & JointVentures\n\n\n\n\n AntitrustandAnti-CompetitionIssuesin\n JointVenturesandOtherCompetitorCollaborations\n\n ScottP.Perlman OralD.Pottinger March 2017\n Partner SeniorAssociate\n (202)263-3201 (202)263-3218\n sperlman@mayerbrown.com opottinger@mayerbrown.com\n\n\n MayerBrownis a global legal services organization comprising legal practices that are separate entities (\"Mayer Brown Practices\"). TheMayer Brown Practices are: Mayer Brown LLP,a limited liability partnership established in theUnited States;\n MayerBrownInternational LLP, a limited liability partnership incorporated in England andWales; Mayer Brown JSM,aHong Kong partnership, and its associatedentities in Asia; andTauil & Chequer Advogados, aBrazilian lawpartnership withwhich\n MayerBrownis associated. \"MayerBrown\" andtheMayer Brown logo are thetrademarks of theMayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions.\n[image: page=1, index=0, ref=@page1_img0, size=798.0x142.0]\n\n[page 2]\nMayerBrown’sJointVentures& StrategicAlliances\nPractice\n\n•Interdisciplinarycapabilities\n•Durableandeffective jointventure andalliance structures\n•Withinajurisdiction andacross borders\n•Multipleindustries\n••ThespectrumoftheJV/SA continuum:ThespectrumoftheJV/SA continuum:\n – PlanningandStrategy\n – FormationandNegotiation\n – BusinessBuilding\n – GovernanceandDisputes\n – ExitsandMonetizations\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\n[page 3]\nSpeakers\n\n\n\n ScottP.Perlman\n sperlman@mayerbrown.com\n WashingtonDC\n T+12022633201\n\n\n OralD.Pottinger\n opottinger@mayerbrown.com\n WashingtonDC\n T+12022633218\n[image: page=3, index=0, ref=@page3_img0, size=260.0x235.0]\n[image: page=3, index=1, ref=@page3_img1, size=260.0x235.0]\n\n[page 4]\nWhatare the Antitrust Laws?\n\n•Antitrustlaw isthelaw of business competition\n•U.S.economy is basedon aCompetitiveModel\n\n\n ––More CompetitionMore CompetitionMore Products/ServicesMore Products/Services\n LowerPrices  BetterService and Quality\n – Monopoly  FewerProducts/Services \n HigherPrices  Poorer Service and Quality\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\n[page 5]\n Whatis thePurpose of\n theAntitrust Laws?\n\n•ToProtectand PromoteProcessof\n Competition Not to ProtectSpecific\n Competitors\n•Antitrust Laws Seekto ProtectConsumer\n Welfare:\n – ToStop Activity That Will Raise Prices orDiminish\n the Quantity orQuality ofProducts and Services\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\n[page 6]\n KeyTerms & Concepts\n\n\n•MarketPower:Abilityofafirm(orcartel)toincreasethe price\n ofproducts/servicesabove competitivelevel, reduce qualityor\n innovationbelowcompetitivelevel, or excludecompetition,\n i.e.,theabilitytocauseanticompetitiveeffects.\n – Generally,Market Power is requiredto demonstratean antitrust\n violation.violation.\n – MarketPower (typically) = High Market Share.\n•Procompetitive:Activitythatenhancesa firm’sabilitytolower\n prices,increaseoutput(e.g., ajointventure thatcreatesnew\n productsorefficiencies).\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\n[page 7]\n KeyTerms & Concepts\n\n•PerSe: Activities deemed to lackany serious pro-\n competitive effects;that almost alwayslead to higher\n prices and reduced output; areconsidered\n automaticallyillegal,i.e., they cannot be justified as a\n matterof law.\n\n\n•Rule of Reason: Most transactions and conduct\n (exceptcollusion) are analyzedto see whether the\n procompetitive benefits outweigh the\n anticompetitive effects.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\n[page 8]\nSPECIFICPROHIBITIONS\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\n[page 9]\n Specific Prohibitions\n Sherman Act §1 (PerSe Violations)\n\n•Generally,anagreementbetweencompetitors thatinvolves:\n – Price-fixing oroutputreduction\n – Bid-rigging\n – Marketallocation (“youtake east, I’lltake west”)\n – Customerallocation (“youtake CustomerA, I’ll takeCustomer B”)\n –– Groupboycotts(e.g.,competitors agreenotto deal withcertainGroupboycotts(e.g.,competitors agreenotto deal withcertain\n customersor suppliers)\n – Tying(where seller uses a“tying”product inwhichit has market\n powertoforcea customer to purchasea “tied”productonwhich\n seller facescompetition)\n\n•Perseviolationscanresult in criminal liability.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\n[page 10]\n Specific Prohibitions\n Sherman Act §1 (Rule ofReason Analysis)\n\n•Ruleof Reasonarrangementsinclude:\n – Mergers\n – Legitimate jointventures\n – Exclusive dealing/contracts\n – Bundledormultiproduct discounts\n ––Tying(where the seller doesnothave market powerintyingproduct)Tying(where the seller doesnothave market powerintyingproduct)\n – Vertical agreements onprice\n•Eventraditionally perse violations (e.g.,competitoragreement\n onprice)maybe judgedunder the RuleofReasonif theyare\n ancillary (reasonablynecessary)toaprocompetitiveendeavor\n (i.e.,an agreementonpricethatenablesaJVbetween\n competitorstooffer anewproduct).\n\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\n[page 11]\n Specific Prohibitions\n Exclusive Dealing (Ruleof Reason Analysis)\n\n• Exclusive Dealing: canresult, forexample, whenaseller agreestogive a\n customeralarge discountinreturn foracustomer agreeingnotto\n purchasetheparticular productor service from anothersupplier.\n• Ingeneralsuchcontractsare consideredprocompetitive – canresult in\n efficiencies fromselling customerlarger volumes; certainty ofsales volume\n canlead tolowerprices.canlead tolowerprices.\n – Can raise anticompetitive concerns if the contract in question forecloses a\n substantialportion of the markettocompetitors of the exclusivedealer.\n – Generally,if the contract forecloses lessthan 30-40%of the market, it is\n unlikely to be anticompetitive. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.\n Hyde,466 U.S.2, 46(O’Connor, J.concurring) (agreement foreclosing 30% or\n lessof relevantmarketunlikely tobe held anticompetitive); United States v.\n Microsoft, 253 F.3d34, 70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct.350 (2001) (40% or\n greaterforeclosure can sustain Section 1 claim thatexclusive contract is\n anticompetitive).\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\n[page 12]\n Specific Prohibitions\n Exclusive Dealing (Ruleof Reason Analysis)\n\n• ExclusiveDealing(cont.):Degreeof foreclosure exceeds40%-\n needtolookmorecloselyatotherfactors,including:\n – Length of contract (1 yearorless generally not an issue; more than 3 years\n morelikely to be an issue).\n –– Whetherremaining sales available in marketare sufficienttoenableWhetherremaining sales available in marketare sufficienttoenable\n competitors to remain in business,maintain competitive cost structure, orcompetitors to remain in business,maintain competitive cost structure, or\n preventthe exclusive dealer from raising prices orreducing other competitive\n efforts(e.g.,service, quality, innovation).\n – Easewith which existing competitors can expand,or new competitors can\n enterif the exclusivedealer raised prices (in general, will expansion or new\n entrytake place within one totwoyears of the price increase atsufficient\n scaleto defeatincrease).\n – Procompetitive justifications forexclusive,see, e.g., Beltone Electronics Corp.,\n 100F.T.C.68, 204 (1982).\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\n[page 13]\n Specific Prohibitions\n Sherman Act §2\n•Prohibits Monopolization, Attempted Monopolization,and\n Conspiraciesto Monopolize amarketbyanticompetitivemeans.\n – Havinga monopolyaloneis NOTa violation.\n – Focusis onthe unlawful use ofmarket powerbya SingleFirm.\n –– MonopolizationRequiresMonopolizationRequiresSignificantSignificantMarket Share (eMarket Share (e..g.,g.,70%).70%).\n – AttemptedMonopolization– canbefoundat 50%.\n – Exclusive contracts,bundledrebates, predatory(belowcost) pricing,\n abuseofapatent, orotherbehaviorthat tendsto exclude or\n disadvantagecompetitors maybeused bya partyto monopolizeor\n attempt to monopolizea market.\n – Activities legal whendonebyapartywithoutmonopolypowermay\n violate Section2if donebyamonopolist (e.g.,exclusive contract).\n – Formationofa JVbetweensignificant competitorscouldbe viewedas a\n conspiracytomonopolize. 13\n\n[page 14]\n Specific Prohibitions\n Clayton Act§ 7\n•ProhibitsMergers,Acquisitionsand JointVentures that May\n SubstantiallyLessenCompetitionor Tend toCreatea\n Monopoly.\n – Section7is ForwardLookingandPredictive – looks beyondthe\n immediate impact ofthemerger(incipiencystandard).\n – Doesnot require anactual lessening ofcompetition butrathera\n conclusionthat the mergeris likelytoraise prices, restrict output,or\n leadto anticompetitive exclusionary conduct.\n•PrimaryConcern = MarketPower – Willthe CombinationTend\n toCreateorFacilitateExerciseofMarketPower?\n•LooktoSeeif CombinationWill LeadtoHigherPricesor\n RestrictedOutput.\n\n\n 14\n\n[page 15]\n Specific Prohibitions\n ClaytonAct§ 3\n\n•Regulatescertainactivities that tend to\n substantially lessen competition or lead to the\n creationof amonopoly including:creationof amonopoly including:\n – Exclusive Dealing,\n – Tying, and\n – ReciprocalDealing.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\n[page 16]\n Specific Prohibitions\n Federal Trade Commission Act § 5\n\n\n•TheFTC Act is broader than the Sherman Act orthe\n ClaytonAct.\n••ItprohibitsItprohibitsUnfairCompetitionandDeceptivePracticesUnfairCompetitionandDeceptivePractices..\n – FTC may use Section 5 to pursueconduct not covered by these\n otherstatutes (e.g.,Intel– attacking broadrange of pricingand\n contractingpractices underSection 5arguablyto avoidSection\n 2requirements).\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\n[page 17]\n Specific Prohibitions\n StateAntitrust Laws\n\n•All of the states have passed their own competition\n laws. Moststateantitrustlawsmirror theShermanAct.\n•Many states also have unfair competition laws that\n aresimilar to the FTC Actaresimilar to the FTC Act..\n•Itis possible foracompany to have simultaneous\n federaland state antitrust enforcement\n actions/investigations pending against it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\n[page 18]\nAntitrustEnforcement: The Basics\n•Thelaws areenforcedby:\n – FederalAgencies\n • DepartmentofJustice (Antitrust Division)\n – EnforcesSherman Act, Clayton Act\n – Criminal and Civil EnforcementAuthority\n ••FederalTradeCommissionFederalTradeCommission\n – EnforcesSherman Act, Clayton Act, FTC Act\n – CivilEnforcement only\n • DepartmentofJustice responsible forcriminal enforcement\n – StateAttorneyGenerals\n – PrivateIndividuals/Entities,ClassActions\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\n[page 19]\nAntitrustEnforcement: The Basics\n\n\n•Violationsoffederal antitrustlawsmay lead to significantcriminal\n fines, jailtime, civildamages and injunctiverelief againstbusinesses\n andindividuals:\n – Entities: fines upto $100M,ordoublethegain/loss\n – Individuals:upto 10years inprison andfines upto$1M,ordouble\n thegain/loss\n –– Private LawsuitsPrivate Lawsuits: civil actions: civil actions----treble damages(triple the amountoftreble damages(triple the amountof\n actualorcompensatorydamages),plus attorneys’ fees andcosts\n•Fines,damages andinjunctiverelief understate law,too.\n•Injunctiverelief may place significantrestrictions onbusiness\n operations(e.g., requireasset divestitures, licensingIP;prohibit\n exclusivecontracts; prohibitjointventure partnersfrom exchanging\n price-relatedinformation).\n\n\n\n\n\n 19\n\n[page 20]\n AntitrustEnforcement: Ata Glance\n\n\n\n\n\n\n $Billions TotalCriminalAntitrustFines\n 4 $3.6\n Billion\n 3.5\n\n 3\n 2.52.5\n\n 2\n\n $1.3\n 1.5 $1.1 $1 Billion\n $1 Billion\n $701 Billion Billion\n 1 $630 Million $555 $524\n Million Million Million $399\n Million\n 0.5\n\n 0\n 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\nSource: U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division,AnnualReport (2010), FiscalYear\nhttps://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-jail-charts\n 20\n[strikethrough: page=20, text=\"$630\", bbox=[110.0, 366.8, 128.3, 377.8]]\n[strikethrough: page=20, text=\"Million\", bbox=[162.7, 367.0, 188.1, 378.0]]\n[strikethrough: page=20, text=\"Billion\", bbox=[508.5, 331.0, 531.2, 342.0]]\n\n[page 21]\n AntitrustEnforcement: Ata Glance\n\n\n IncarcerationTrend\n Average PrisonSentenceinMonths\n\n\n 22\n 20\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n Avg 1990 -1999 2000 -2009 2010-2016\n FiscalYear\n\n\n\nSource: U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division,AnnualReport (2010),\nhttps://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-jail-charts\n 21\n\n[page 22]\nJOINTVENTURES\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 23\n\n[page 23]\n AntitrustGuidelinesforCollaboration\n AmongCompetitors(FTC&DOJ)\n•Ajoint report byfederalantitrustenforcementagencies\n providingguidanceon howcompetitorsmaycollaborate\n withoutrunningafoul oftheantitrustlaws\n•Thereportprovidesguidanceregardingdifferentforms of\n collaboration andillustrativeexamplescollaboration andillustrativeexamples\n•http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\n[page 24]\n Analysis ofJoint Ventures\n IstheJV “Legitimate”?\n•KeyQuestion = Are there procompetitiveeffects oris the\n collaborationa cartel capableof engaging in perse illegalactivity?\n•Examplesofprocompetitiveeffects:\n – Enablesthe creation ofa newproduct;\n –– Reductionin priceReductionin priceformarket buyers;formarket buyers;\n – Measurableefficiencies the parties couldnotachieve ontheir own.\n•See DOJ/FTC Guidelines, Example 6 (p.31):Acollaboration between two\n softwarecompetitors combinestheir complimentary capabilities in order to\n produce a better word processing program thatneither could offer alone.\n•Comparewith DOJ/FTC Guidelines, Example 7 (p.32): Where parties agree on\n product component without integration of activities, the collaboration does not\n createanyprocompetitive benefits but, instead, is ashamto increase the\n participating companies’profits.\n\n 25\n\n[page 25]\n Analysis ofJoint Ventures\nDoesOperationof the JVViolatethe AntitrustLaws?\n• KeyQuestion = Willthe JVpartnerssetprices,allocate\n markets,agreenottocompete,etc., without alegitimate\n procompetitivepurpose?\n• Suchagreementsmaybe a perse violationunless theyare\n ancillary (reasonablynecessary)toaccomplishtheJV’s\n procompetitivepurposes, inwhichcasethe ruleof reasonprocompetitivepurposes, inwhichcasethe ruleof reason\n applies.\n• See DOJ/FTC Guidelines, Example 4 (p.31): Two software companies, both\n struggling to market and distribute their products, forma JVwith pricing\n control tojointly accomplish those goals. The anticompetitive risk(price-fixing)\n isbalanced against the JV’s procompetitive effects(increased products).\n• Comparewith DOJ/FTC Guidelines, Example 5 (pp.31-32): Two carpart\n manufacturersagree to refrain from competing in alternating years. This\n arrangement islikely per seillegal.\n 26\n\n[page 26]\n Analysis ofJoint Ventures\nWillformationof the JV confer marketpower?\n •KeyQuestions = (1)Will theJVconfer marketpower on\n theparticipatingcompaniesthatwould not exist\n otherwise?(2)Ifso,dotheJV’sprocompetitivebenefits\n outweigh thepotentialanticompetitiverisks?\n ••Accordingto theFTC/DOJGuidelines,Sec.3.33:marketAccordingto theFTC/DOJGuidelines,Sec.3.33:market\n powerincreasestheabilityofthecompaniestocreate\n anticompetitiveeffectsbut…\n – “Market shareandmarket concentration provideonlya starting\n pointforevaluatingthe competitive effect” of ajoint venture.\n – A mainfactor in the agencies’ evaluationofa JV is whether\n “anticompetitive harm is more orless likely.”\n\n\n\n\n 27\n\n[page 27]\n Analysis ofJoint Ventures\n\nWhat Factors are Relevant as to the Effect on Competition?\n • KeyQuestion = tothe extentthe JVpartieswillcontinue to\n competewitheachother outside the JV,willfactorssuchas\n thetermsof the JVagreement,structureof the JV\n management,and access tocompetitive information restrain\n suchcompetition?\n • Agenciesconsider whethercompetingJVpartieswillhave the\n incentiveandabilitytocompetebasedonfactorssuchas:\n\n – Does the agreementpermit such competition?\n – Do parties retain independent control of assetsrequired to compete?\n – Do parties retain control of the JV’s and their own decision makingon\n competitive issues?\n – Whatis the likelihood of anticompetitive information sharing?\n\n\n 28\n\n[page 28]\n JOINT VENTURE\nGOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT\n ANDRECENT CASE LAWANDRECENT CASE LAW\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 29\n\n[page 29]\n EnforcementAgencyGuidance:\n General Motors – Toyota (FTC 1984)\n•FACTS: GM andToyotaproductionjointventure fornewsubcompactcars\n•CONCERNS: That GM wouldstop independentdevelopment ofsmall\n carsandthat JV wouldresult in exchangesofsensitive competitive\n informationnotrequiredto achieve the JV’s benefits\n•BENEFITS: Increased consumerchoiceofcars andreducedproduction\n coststo GMcoststo GM\n•AGENCYRESPONSE: JVpermitted toproceed,butFTCorder\n prohibitedexchangesofinformation betweentheparties regarding:\n – Theprices of cars or component partsproduced by the JV thatthe parties\n would marketseparately, other than for the purpose of a supplier-customer\n relationship, and\n – Saleor production forecasts,and costs fornon-JV products\n\n\n\n\n\n 30\n\n[page 30]\n EnforcementAgencyGuidance:\n Boeing– Lockheed Martin (FTC 2007)\n• FACTS:Boeing and Lockheed Martin formed a jointventureto combine the only\n twosuppliers tothe U.S.governmentforheavyto medium launch services toput\n spacevehicles intoorbit. The governmentpurchased the space vehicles from three\n principal suppliers – Boeing,Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.\n• CONCERNS: The JV would create a monopoly, and thatinformation exchanges\n would reduce competition between the JV parties and otherJV customers.\n• BENEFITS:The DOD supported the JV ascritical to national security.\n• AGENCYRESPONSE: The FTC order required that in providing its services:\n\n – TheJV not providepreferential terms toBoeing and Lockheed Martin, and\n\n – Limitinformationexchange ofprice,cost and proprietaryinformation between Boeingand\n LockheedMartin, and between each ofthese parties and the JV, unless strictly necessaryforJV\n success.\n\n – Informationexchange limited toBoeingand Lockheed Martin personnel whowerenot involved in\n competing withthese suppliers forgovernment programs.\n\n – JVmust maintain separate informationsystems,appropriate firewalls and a separate officelocation.\n\n – TheJV alsowasrequired todesign acompliance program and provide trainingtoensure restrictions\n oninformationexchanges wereobserved.\n 31\n\n[page 31]\n RecentCase Law:\n American Needle, Inc. v. NFL (2010)\n\n•ChallengetoNFLP’sgrantofexclusiveapparel licenseto\n Reebok\n•NFLargued itshould be regardedas a“single entity”and not\n subjecttoSection1ofthe ShermanAct\n••U.S.Supreme CourtheldthatNFL’slicensingactivitywasnotU.S.Supreme CourtheldthatNFL’slicensingactivitywasnot\n categoricallybeyondthereachofSection1,butratherwas\n subjecttoanalysisunder theRuleof Reason\n•Crucialfacts: NFLPwas controlled by agroupofwould-be\n competitors anddeprived the marketplaceof independent\n centersof economicdecision-making\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 32\n\n[page 32]\n JOINTVENTURE\nANTITRUST GUIDELINES\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 33\n\n[page 33]\n JVGuidelines\n Information Exchange\n•Restrictinformation exchangebetween JV partners on\n businesswherethecompaniescompeteregarding(a)\n pricing,(b)outputand(c)marketstrategy.\n•Restrictinformation exchangebetween JV partners tothe\n extenttheJVcontinuestocompetewithone or bothextenttheJVcontinuestocompetewithone or both\n parties.\n•Specificquestionsreguidelines?\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 34\n\n[page 34]\n JVGuidelines\n Information Exchange\n\n• Guidelines Section 2.1– JV partners Commercially SensitiveInformation can’t be\n sharedwith JV directors, officers, managers,employees,etc.\n\n – Example– Canthe same Companysalesperson alsohandleJV sales? Tothe same\n customers?\n\n – Example– Customer asksJV salesperson to provide comparison of JV price toprice of\n Partner 1Partner 1––cansalesperson provide this? Whatif salesperson isPartner 1 employee?cansalesperson provide this? Whatif salesperson isPartner 1 employee?\n Shouldcustomer be toldto get estimatefrom someone else atPartner 1?\n• Guidelines Section 3.1– JV partners employees working for JVcan’t provide JV\n Commercially Sensitive Information toeither company directors, officers, etc.\n – Example– Customer asksJV salesperson (Partner 1 employee) if Partner 1 willreduce\n priceto meet the JV price. Can thesalesperson askPartner 1 todo this? Go to Partner\n 1officer or director who alsoisa JV officer or director?\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 35\n\n[page 35]\n JVGuidelines\n Market Power\n\n•Formationofthe JV adds a newoptiontothe market.\n•ButJVwill reducecompetition if JVpartners are nolongerindependent\n competingoptionsin market.\n•Theguidelines (Section4.2)provide: oncea customer decides it does not\n wanttousethe JV,wanttousethe JV,JVpartnersJVpartnersmustcompetemustcompeteforbusiness as if noJVforbusiness as if noJV\n existed.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n 36\n\n[errors]\n- Page 2 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae506c50>')\n- Page 3 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae506f20>')\n- Page 4 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52c630>')\n- Page 5 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52c950>')\n- Page 6 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52c9a0>')\n- Page 7 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52cae0>')\n- Page 8 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52cdb0>')\n- Page 9 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52cc70>')\n- Page 10 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52d210>')\n- Page 11 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52d3a0>')\n- Page 12 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52d6c0>')\n- Page 13 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52d800>')\n- Page 14 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52d5d0>')\n- Page 15 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52dc60>')\n- Page 16 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52de90>')\n- Page 17 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52e0c0>')\n- Page 18 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52e2f0>')\n- Page 19 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52e520>')\n- Page 20 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52e750>')\n- Page 21 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52eb10>')\n- Page 22 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52f330>')\n- Page 23 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52f100>')\n- Page 24 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52f5b0>')\n- Page 25 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52f830>')\n- Page 26 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52fb00>')\n- Page 27 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52fce0>')\n- Page 28 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52ffb0>')\n- Page 29 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52dda0>')\n- Page 30 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae52f9c0>')\n- Page 31 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae54c040>')\n- Page 32 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae54c180>')\n- Page 33 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae54c450>')\n- Page 34 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae54c680>')\n- Page 35 image /Im2: UnidentifiedImageError('cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0xffffae54c900>')"},"search":null}

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